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Abstract 
This study investigates the effect of family involvement on family firms’ entrepreneurial 
behavior through decentralization. Borrowing from agency theory and using a sample of 145 
entrepreneurs, this study contributes to entrepreneurship literature by providing a fine-grained 
explanation about how a decision-making mechanism such as decentralization influences the 
relationship between family involvement and innovativeness, and risk taking of family firms. 
Furthermore, this study demonstrates the importance of considering heterogeneity of family 
firms and the focal role of decentralization in spurring up firm-level entrepreneurship. 
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1. Introduction  
Family firms are an important area of research in the past three decades (Gedajlovic et al., 
2012). Family firms owe their importance to the world economy and unique organizational 
structure (Zahra et al., 2004), which consists of distinctive features like family involvement in 
management (FIM), generational succession (Kim & Gao, 2013) and strong family orientation 
(Uhlaner et al., 2012). In recent years, many studies attempt to understand what makes family 
firms successful (Choi et al., 2015; Dyer, 2006; Gedajlovic et al., 2012). However, this stream of 
research still does not manage to establish family firms’ relevance in entrepreneurship (Uhlaner 
et al., 2012). The literature also presents conflicting findings about the effect of FIM on firm 
entrepreneurship and performance (Kim & Gao, 2013). These challenges may be mainly a 
product of studies looking at family firms vs. non-family firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012), thus 
overlooking the fact that family firms are heterogeneous. Even studies that focus only on family 
firms fall short on investigating the effect of various antecedents on entrepreneurship and firm 
performance (Naldi et al., 2007). 
One antecedent is family involvement, which has some prominence in family-business 
research (Kellermans et al., 2008). However, the mechanisms through which family involvement 
influences organizational outcomes such as entrepreneurship lack research (Gao & Kim, 2013). 
No studies explain clearly how variables such as decentralization (or low centralization), which 
are an important dimension of organizational culture (Zahra et al., 2004), usually become an 
outcome of family involvement (Lindow, 2013), and “get in between” family involvement and 
entrepreneurial engagement of family firms. Instead of investigating whether family firms are 
more entrepreneurial than non-family firms, this study provides a more appropriate research 
question to ask: What are the intervening variables that influence the relationship between family 
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firm’s characteristics and entrepreneurship? The present study takes an important step in this 
direction. More specifically, this research investigates how decentralization mediates the 
relationship between family involvement and innovativeness, and risk taking. 
This study contributes to the literature of family firms and entrepreneurship. First, unlike 
many studies comparing family vs. non-family firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Naldi et al., 
2007), this study looks solely at family firms and captures firm heterogeneity regarding family 
involvement. Second, this study offers a fine-grained explanation of processes such as 
decentralized structure to uncover the indirect relationship between family involvement and 
entrepreneurial behavior of family firms. 
The organization of this research is as follows. Section 1 posits hypotheses about family 
entrepreneurship employing agency-theory underpinnings. Section 2 explains the research design 
and presents the findings. Section 3 discusses results and offers conclusions and suggestions for 
future research. 
 
2.  Theory and hypothesis development  
2.1.  Family involvement and innovativeness, and risk taking 
The effect of family involvement on organizational outcomes builds on agency theory. 
Agency theory contends that agency costs arise because of self-interested individuals and their 
decisions oriented to their own preferences (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Some agency theorists 
believe that family firms represent an ideal organizational form where the objectives of the 
owner align with those of the firm (Zahra, 2005). This close alignment leads to more effective 
decision-making that contributes to the continuation of the firm. Agency theorists also advocate 
that owners take a long-term and visionary approach to decision making because founders want 
5 
 
to create a legacy of their success or because they wish to maximize their families’ wealth. 
Owner-managers must demonstrate commitment to firms’ success through pursuing 
entrepreneurial opportunities and supporting innovations (Zahra, 2005).  
With the separation of ownership and management in family firms, more people 
participate in decision making and thus agency costs occur because of different preferences and 
information asymmetries of the owner (principal) and the employed management (agent) 
(Schulze et al., 2001). These issues arise mainly because the individual managers have a short-
term view and seek financial gains whereas the owners’ preference is long-term interest and the 
sustainable development of the business. Besides these issues, agency costs in family firms occur 
because of relational and altruistic preferences (Mustakallio et al., 2002; Popo & Zenger, 2002). 
Families tend to keep control of the firm and wealth in the family rather than wanting to share 
the benefits of the business with the ‘outsiders.’ On the one hand, family firms should be less 
prone to agency problems when ownership and control are in the hands of a few select family 
members (Zahra, 2005). On the other hand, Dyer (2006) offers a countering view that family 
involvement leads to higher agency costs because of the conflicting goals of family members. In 
particular, parental altruism may give rise to the hiring of family members (i.e., nepotism) 
(Schulze et al., 2001; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) which in turn is likely to lead to monitoring 
difficulties of their job performance (Dyer, 2006). Parental altruism opens the door for the failure 
of family members to monitor each other, which causes agency issues such as opportunism, 
shirking, and adverse selection (Dyer, 2006). These agency issues must have an influence on 
firm entrepreneurship and performance. In addition, firm strategy has both financial and socio-
emotional implications for family wealth and the longevity of the family business which, in turn, 
lead these firms to be more conservative (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Nieto et al., 2015). 
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Consequently, these firms may be hesitant to engage in corporate innovation (Le Breton & 
Miller, 2009) or to undertake business strategies that lead to higher variability in performance 
(i.e., risk) (Zahra, 2005).  
The level of conservatism may be stronger if more family members participate in the day-
to-day operations of a family firm because these members strive for preserving family wealth at 
any cost. Thus, the precautionary approach of family members tends to manifest in the decision-
making process within a firm. Zahra et al. (2004) argue that family involvement hinders 
entrepreneurship within family firms. As family involvement in managing business increases, 
non-family members might feel like they are not part of key decisions and have less freedom to 
act (Zahra, 2005). Non-family employees face the daunting task of turning to family members 
prior to introducing a novel idea about improving the business. The feeling of having less voice 
and freedom to act in a firm may eventually lead to losing these employees. This loss, in turn, 
would cause an organization to lack valuable sources of ideas that could spur innovativeness and 
entrepreneurial risk-taking (Zahra, 2005). Empirically, Chen and Hsu (2009) confirm these 
claims by showing that family firms are less innovative than non-family firms.  
H1: Family involvement relates negatively to innovativeness.  
H2: Family involvement relates negatively to risk taking.  
 
2.2. The mediating effect of decentralization  
Decisions in small businesses generally hinge on business owners’ philosophies and their 
management style. Therefore, in small firms, delegating business tasks and applying the correct 
amount of control (i.e., high decentralization) constitute a challenge. Family firms gain 
prominence for their centralized organizational structure (low decentralization), which leads to 
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even tighter coordination and control (Zahra et al., 2004). Supporting this view, previous 
research portrays family firms as restricting family members’ involvement in the firm’s decision-
making process (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2007). No literature exists regarding how family 
involvement affects decentralization. However, building on agency theory, several reasons 
support why having a larger number of family employees participating in business decisions 
should lead to less decentralized decision-making in operations. First, having a higher level of 
family involvement can cause more divergence in owners’ goals, which may escalate agency 
costs. Second, when a larger proportion of family members are employees, the entrepreneur 
faces a dual concern: providing for employed family members and running a successful business. 
For family firms, offering continuous employment to family members tends to take precedence 
over achieving firm performance. Therefore, a way to satisfy these dual goals for the business 
owner is to exercise some care when granting autonomy to employees to safeguard family wealth 
and to ensure “succession of the business” (Miller & Le Breton Miller, 2006). The discussion 
shows that higher family involvement in family firms should lead to lower decentralization (i.e., 
high centralization). 
Previous studies report that low decentralization of decision-making impedes the use of 
imagination by employees and reduces the probability of finding creative solutions to problems 
within a firm (Caruana et al., 1998). In the context of family firms, low decentralization also 
concentrates the power in the hands of select individuals. This concentration of power leads to 
organizational rigidity, which impedes the exchange of ideas by employees, and thus has a 
suppressing effect on innovativeness (Zahra et al., 2004). Previous studies offer consistent 
empirical evidence of the stifling effect of centralization (i.e., low decentralization) on 
entrepreneurship (Caruana et al., 1998; Zahra et al., 2004).  
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Taken together, these relationships point out to the corollary that family involvement may 
have an indirect effect on entrepreneurial risk-taking and innovativeness through 
decentralization. High family involvement creates higher agency costs that lead to a lower degree 
of decentralization. In turn, decentralization has a positive effect on risk taking and 
innovativeness. Overall, this study contends that higher family involvement will lead to lower 
entrepreneurial risk-taking and innovativeness through decentralization. Figure 1 depicts the 
model of this study. 
H3: Decentralization mediates the relationship between family involvement and 
innovativeness, so that family involvement has a negative indirect effect on innovativeness  
H4: Decentralization mediates the relationship between family involvement and risk 
taking, so that family involvement has a negative indirect effect on risk taking.  
Figure 1 here. 
 
3.  Method  
3.1.  Sampling  
The sample population for the questionnaire study included family-owned SMEs 
operating in three main sectors (manufacturing, retailing, and hospitality) in England. The study 
used probability sampling to test the research model. Authors selected 1,000 family-owned 
SMEs from the UK Business Directory of Small Business Federation and other published small 
business directories with the aim of achieving a minimum of 150 responses in order to test the 
posited model. The qualification question: “Do you consider this firm a family business?” (Naldi 
et al., 2007) brought the final sample to 145 business owners who agreed to be in a face-to-face 
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structure interview or “structured questionnaire”. Selected firms were either micro business (2 to 
9 employees) or small businesses (10 to 49 employees). 
 
3.2. Measures and data analysis 
The family involvement, as an independent variable, refers to the degree of family 
members’ involvement in ownership, board of directors, or management (Liang et al., 2013). 
Habbershon et al. (2003) developed the term familiness to define the unique combination of 
involvement and interaction between the family and the business that creates a distinctive firm-
level bundle of resources and capabilities. Even though the concept of familiness may be 
difficult to capture, previous studies show that family businesses differ from non-family 
businesses along several dimensions (Ensley & Pearson, 2005). These differences are 
particularly relevant concerning corporate governance—because corporate governance is at the 
top of the organization—and particularly in board of directors—where family members and non-
family members meet and interact in formal circumstances to evaluate current performance and 
to take strategic decisions. 
Family involvement is a complex measure that several studies capture in a different way. 
The most common operationalization of this concept is the percentage of family members 
involved in top management teams or board of directors (Liang et al., 2013). Hence, this study 
adopts a measure that resembles the one by Liang et al. (2013), and estimates the independent 
variable—family involvement (FAMINV)—as the percentage of family employees to total 
employees. This calculation captures family involvement better than a simple count of family 
employees because the effect of 5 family members in decision making will be much stronger in a 
firm with 10 than in a firm with 30 employees. 
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This study includes two outcome variables: innovativeness (INNOV) and risk taking 
(RISK). These variables are sub-dimensions of the entrepreneurial-orientation construct (Naldi et 
al., 2007). Innovativeness links with seeking creative solutions to problems and needs leading to 
transformational change. Risk-taking refers to the willingness to commit significant resources to 
opportunities, which have a reasonable chance of costly failure (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). 
INNOV includes five items that come from Covin and Slevin (1989), Hurt et al. (1977), and 
Miller and Friesen (1983). RISK encompasses seven statements adapted from Miller (1983), and 
Covin and Slevin (1989). 
The moderating variable—decentralization (DECENTRAL)—relates to devolving 
decision-making power to the lower levels of hierarchy rather than concentrating authority at the 
top and around few individuals; empowering more people to vouch for their ideas and taking 
initiatives to stimulate entrepreneurship in firms (Covin & Slevin, 1989). Five statements 
adapted from Thomas and McDaniel (1990) form the basis for DECENTRAL. This project uses 
a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree for the above 
statements pertaining to dependent and moderating variables. Cronbach’s alpha for 
DECENTRAL, INNOV, and RISK scales have acceptable internal consistency values (0.72, 
0.87, and 0.81, respectively) according to the 0.70 threshold value of Nunnally (1978). 
The study controls for the effect of firm age, firm size, and industry type. Firm age 
(AGE) is the number of years since founding (Liang et al., 2013). The number of employees 
determines firm size (SIZE). Measurement of industry type (IND) relies on a categorical 
variable. This study includes seven distinct industry categories, namely: retailing, wholesale, 
restaurants, cafes, fast food, professional and services, and manufacturing.  
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This study estimates a path analytic model with STATA 13.0. The study conducts the 
mediation analysis with sgmediation routine that uses Sobell-Goodman procedure (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004). This study uses the bootstrapping method with case resampling and confidence 
intervals with percentile estimates for the mediation analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) 
 
4.  Findings  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the present study. The analysis reveals that the 
mean values of INNNOV and RISK statements are 4.41 and 4.18, respectively. The degree of 
family involvement is approximately 47%. The average family firm in this sample is 10 years old 
and has about 10 employees. Intercorrelations and low variance inflation factor (VIF) values 
(VIF<1.5) among independent and control variables indicate that potential multicollinearity is 
not an issue. 
Table 1 here. 
Table 2 shows the results of the model. The relationship between FAMINV and INNOV 
is negative but not significant, which does not offer support for H1. The model with FAMINV 
and control variables explains 30% of the variance in INNOV. Findings demonstrate that the 
relation between FAMINV and RISK is not significant, which does not lend support for H2. 
Overall, the model with FAMINV and controls AGE, SIZE, and INDUSTRY accounts for 29% 
of the variance in RISK.  
Because the effect of FAMINV on two entrepreneurship variables is not significant, the 
present study tests for indirect only mediation (Zhao et al., 2010). Mediation analysis reveals that 
FAMINV relates negatively to DECENTRAL (b = -1.96, p < 0.001), which in turn relates 
positively to both INNOV (b = 0.36, p < 0.01) and RISK (b = 0.32, p < 0.01). An evaluation of 
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the indirect effect of DECENTRAL reveals that FAMINV has a negative indirect effect on 
INNOV (-1.01, p < 0.001) that offers support for H3. In the same fashion, DECENTRAL 
mediates the relationship between FAMINV and RISK, where FAMINV has a negative indirect 
influence on RISK (b= -0.95, p < 0.001). Interestingly, the ratio of indirect effect to total effect 
(i.e., the sum of direct and indirect effects) is 67% for INNOV and 85% for RISK, which means 
that FAMINV affects INNOV and RISK mostly through DECENTRAL rather than directly. 
Table 2 also reports that the total effect of FAMINV on two outcome variables (INNOV and 
RISK) is significant because of the mediation effect of DECENTRAL. 
 This study conducts an additional analysis to ensure that the results are robust. This study 
assesses whether firms that owner-operators manage versus firms with passive owners or 
employee managers demonstrate higher innovativeness and risk-taking. Findings indicate that 
family firms who have an owner-operator in charge are less entrepreneurial than their two 
counterparts. More importantly, the mediation of DECENTRAL on two outcome variables 
remains significant. 
Table 2 here. 
 
5.  Discussion  
This study demonstrates that family involvement has no direct influence on 
innovativeness and risk taking of family firms. At a first glance, findings of this project do not 
support results of Zahra (2005). However, results of the present study reveal that decentralization 
is an important antecedent of innovativeness and risk-taking, which coincides with the findings 
of Caruana et al. (1998). Consequently, because family involvement has a negative effect on 
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decentralization, the total effect of family involvement on innovativeness and risk taking is 
significant and negative.  
This study contributes to the literature of family firms and entrepreneurship. Firstly, this 
research uses family involvement, an important dimension that previous research neglects, to 
explain the entrepreneurial behavior of family firms. Secondly, this study demonstrates how 
decentralization mediates the indirect relationship between family involvement and 
entrepreneurial behavior of family firms. Apparently, no direct relationship between family 
involvement and entrepreneurial behavior of family firms exists. However, when family firms 
undergo a decentralization process, the involvement of family members in decision-making and 
operations of the firms affects both innovativeness and risk-taking negatively. This effect 
suggests that family firms can gain from the decentralization. However, decentralization could be 
of benefit to family firms only if they reduce the family involvement and shift away from the 
traditional management. A family-involved approach to decision-making and operations might 
not encourage diverse and creative representation in the strategic direction and activities of firms 
and thus hinder innovation. A family-dominated approach might lead to a more cautious and 
traditional attitude towards risk-taking, impeding a firm’s ability to reap the benefits of 
opportunities in the market.  
However, this study has some limitations. First, the study applies the model in a large 
metropolitan area of a major developed country (the United Kingdom). Entrepreneurs in 
developing countries may have different motivations to engage in business ownership, which 
may influence the results of the present model. Therefore, future studies should test the model in 
developing countries. Second, this study uses path analysis, which rests on linearity assumption. 
Therefore, the results do not show how risk taking and innovativeness changes in the absence of 
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some conditions such as firm age and firm size. Future studies should use comparative 
qualitative analysis to identify a set of conditions that lead to innovativeness and risk taking. 
Lastly, although the measure of family involvement captures the scope of family involvement, 
this scope does not consider the depth of family involvement. Future studies should employ 
measures that include both the scope (percentage of family involvement) and the depth (degree 
of involvement in key operating functions such as sales, operations, accounting, etc.). Future 
studies should also consider family orientation, organizational culture, entrepreneurial 
orientation, and firm performance to offer a more holistic picture of how entrepreneurship 
operates in family firms. Looking into additional factors will allow getting into “the blackbox” of 
entrepreneurial orientation of family firms. 
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Figure 1. Antecedents of innovativeness and risk taking 
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Notes: FAMINV= Family Involvement, DECENTRAL= Decentralization, 
INNOV=Innovativeness, RISK=Risk     taking;   ---- Dashed lines denote a mediating effect 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. INNOV 4.41 1.87 1      
2. RISK 4.18  1.57           0.83* 1     
3. FAMINV 0.46     0.35          -0.28* -0.25* 1    
4. DECENTRAL 3.90     1.57           0.44* 0.45* -0.48* 1   
5. FIRMAGE 10.86 10.04 -0.26* -0.24* -0.01 -0.26* 1  
6. SIZE 9.81 24.25 0.15 0.14 -0.30* 0.09 0.20* 1 
 Notes: SD= Standard Deviation, * p < 0.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. Family Involvement, Decentralization, Innovativeness and Risk-taking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: t-values appear in parentheses; Values in parenthesis for H3 and H4 are z-values; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; 
 
Hypothesized Path Direct 
Effect 
Indirect Effect  
(through 
DECENTRAL) 
Total 
Effect 
Supported 
H1:FAMINVINNOV -0.67 (-1.33) - - NO 
H2: FAMINV  RISK -0.01 (-0.01) - - NO 
H3: FAMINVDECENTRALINNOV        -1.01 (-3.69)*** -1.68 (-3.47)** YES 
H4:  FAMINVDECENTRALRISK  -0.95 (-3.98)*** -0.96 (-3.03)** YES 
     
     
